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ABSTRACT 
In the Internet age, complex telecommunications systems are 
often deployed with little regard for international borders.  In NTP, 
Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., the Federal Circuit determined 
that one such system infringed several U.S. patents, despite the fact 
that an essential element of the system was located outside the 
territorial United States.  This iBrief argues that the Federal 
Circuit erred in invoking the “control and beneficial use” test, 
which it culled from the very few prior cases addressing 
extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law.  In doing so, the 
court disregarded the Supreme Court’s direction in Deepsouth 
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. that the United States’ patent laws 
make no claim to extraterritorial effect. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In 1993, as the astonishing potential of the burgeoning Internet was 
just becoming apparent, Professor Dan L. Burk made a prediction: 
The dissolution of geographic, political, and temporal barriers made 
possible by global computer networks may pose a new challenge to the 
operation of U.S. patent law – a challenge not yet fully realized and 
likely impossible for the framers of the present patent code to 
anticipate, but a challenge whose parameters can already be seen.2
Eleven years later, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit faced this 
challenge – and flinched.   
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, 2006, Duke University School of Law; M.B.A., Duke 
University Fuqua School of Business; M.S. in Electrical Engineering, Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University; B.E. in Electrical Engineering, 
Georgia Institute of Technology.  The author would like to thank Kenneth 
Bassinger and Professor James Boyle for helpful discussions and comments. 
2 Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on 
Global Computer Networks, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1993). 
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¶2 In NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 3 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit faced the question whether the 
defendant’s popular BlackBerry system, a complex wireless messaging 
service, infringed several U.S. patents despite the fact that a critical element 
of the system was located in Canada and from there coupled via the Internet 
to the remaining elements located in the United States.4  The court answered 
in the affirmative, holding that since the “control and beneficial use” of the 
system was in the United States, the “situs of the ‘use’” was in the United 
States for the purposes of infringement analysis.5 
¶3 This iBrief argues that the Federal Circuit based its conclusion on a 
flawed understanding and application of the “control and beneficial use” 
test it gleaned from the few earlier cases addressing similar situations.  
Worse, the court’s decision disregards the Supreme Court’s clear instruction 
in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.6 that courts should interpret 
patent law conservatively, particularly when questions of extraterritorial 
sovereignty are implicated, and leave to Congress the task of extending the 
patent grant, if such an extension is warranted.  This iBrief begins with an 
outline of the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Research in Motion, followed by 
a description of the thin body of pre-Internet case law that provided the 
basis for that analysis.  Part III criticizes the court’s reasoning, while Part 
IV suggests that its decision not only creates additional uncertainty in the 
application of patent law to international communication networks, but also 
signals a continued willingness by the federal courts to increase the 
territorial coverage of the patent grant, even in the face of contrary 
instructions from the Supreme Court, whenever the interests of U.S. patent 
holders are threatened. 
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN RESEARCH IN MOTION 
¶4 Research in Motion, Ltd. (“RIM”) was accused of infringing five 
patents directed to “integrat[ing] existing electronic mail systems with RF 
wireless communications networks.”7  The district court ultimately ruled on 
                                                     
3 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
4 Id. at 1368.  The BlackBerry system couples conventional enterprise and 
Internet-based e-mail systems to a wireless network, allowing users to retrieve 
and send messages with a portable wireless device.  See id. at 1341-43 for a 
detailed description of the BlackBerry system. 
5 Id. at 1370. 
6 406 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1972). 
7 Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1341.  (“RF” stands for “radio frequency”).  
The five patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 5,436,960 (issued Jul. 25, 1995); 5,625,670 
(issued Apr. 29, 1997); 5,819,172 (issued Oct. 6, 1998); 6,067,451 (issued May 
23, 2000); and 6,317,592 (issued Nov. 13, 2001), all derived from the same 
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sixteen claims; RIM was found to infringe all of them.8  On appeal, RIM 
challenged the district court’s construction of several claim terms.  The 
Federal Circuit rejected all of RIM’s challenges but one, reversing the 
district court’s interpretation of the term “originating processor,”9 and 
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings on five of the 
sixteen claims.10 
¶5 RIM also challenged the district court’s holding that “the fact that 
the BlackBerry relay is located in Canada is not a bar to infringement in this 
matter.”11   According to RIM, section 271(a) of the Patent Act12 provides 
that direct infringement of a U.S. patent should only be found if all of the 
accused activity takes place inside the United States.13  Therefore, urged 
RIM, since a key element of the system (the BlackBerry Relay, 
corresponding to an “interface” element in several of the claims in suit)14 
was located in Canada, direct infringement in the United States was not 
possible under section 271(a).15  In making this argument, RIM relied on 
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,16 described by the court as “the 
seminal case addressing the territoriality of section 271(a).”17   
¶6 Deepsouth involved an infringer who had been enjoined in an 
earlier proceeding from making or selling a patented machine used for 
deveining shrimp.18  The infringer sought a modification of the injunction to 
                                                                                                                       
initial application and thus contained the same written description.  Id.  Between 
them, these patents contain an astounding total of 1,594 claims!  
8 Id. at 1344.  NTP was awarded almost $54 million in damages; the court also 
permanently enjoined further use of the BlackBerry system and devices in the 
United States, but stayed the injunction pending appeal.  See id. at 1339. 
9 Id. at 1351. 
10 Id. at 1366.  On March 16, 2005, RIM announced a settlement with NTP, 
under which it agreed to pay NTP $450 million.  BlackBerry Maker Agrees to 
Settle Patent Dispute, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2005, at B4.  
11 Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1367 (quoting the district court). 
12 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).  Section 271(a) states “Except as otherwise 
provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or 
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes 
the patent.” 
13 Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1367.  Rephrased more precisely by the 
court, “RIM’s position is that if a claim limitation of a patented system would 
only be met by a component of the accused system . . . located outside the 
United States, then the entire system or method is beyond the reach of section 
271(a).”  Id. at 1368. 
14 Id. at 1367. 
15 Id. 
16 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
17 Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1368. 
18 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 519-20. 
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allow him to export the machines unassembled.19  The Supreme Court held 
that the unassembled machines could not infringe the patent under section 
271(a) because the right to exclude granted by the patent applied only to the 
“operable assembly of the whole and not the manufacture of its parts.”20  
The Court suggested that Congress could extend the coverage of the patent 
law if it wished;21 Congress later responded to Deepsouth by adding section 
271(f), which specifically extends liability for the export of unassembled 
inventions.22 
¶7 Since the BlackBerry system does not fall under section 271(f),23 
RIM argued that the logic of Deepsouth would preclude infringement, as 
one claimed element of the accused system was not found within the United 
States.24  The Federal Circuit, however, found that the “use” of the system 
was indeed in the United States,25 asserting that “[t]he case before us can be 
distinguished from Deepsouth in that ‘the location of the infringement is 
within United States territory, not abroad as in Deepsouth.’”26  Thus, the 
                                                     
19 Id. at 524. 
20 Id. at 528.   
21 See id. at 530 (“When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how 
far Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress.”). 
22 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (“Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be 
supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the 
components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in 
whole or in part . . . shall be liable as an infringer.”); Research in Motion, 392 
F.3d at 1369. 
23 See Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1367 (“[W]e conclude that subsection(a) 
is the appropriate vehicle for NTP’s infringement suit . . .”). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1370. 
26 Id. at 1369 (quoting Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1074 (Ct. Cl. 
1976)).  Strictly speaking, there was no infringement “abroad” in Deepsouth, 
since it is unquestionable that section 271(a) cannot apply to conduct that is 
entirely outside the United States.  See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 
215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  Had the Federal Circuit phrased its 
statement more precisely, i.e. “The case before us can be distinguished from 
Deepsouth in that the location of the accused conduct is within United States 
territory, not abroad  as in Deepsouth,” its argument would have been less 
convincing.  The precise question in Deepsouth was whether conduct in the 
United States, namely the preparing for export of unassembled components of a 
patented assembly, constituted infringement.  Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 524.  
Similarly, the question in Research in Motion was whether RIM’s conduct in the 
United States could constitute direct infringement despite the fact that part of the 
accused system lay outside the borders of the United States.  Research in 
Motion, 392 F.3d at 1368.   The Federal Circuit’s statement appears simply to 
say “Because we find here that RIM infringes (within the United States), this 
case can be distinguished from Deepsouth, in which the Supreme Court found 
no infringement.” 
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court asserted, finding direct infringement here would not “present the 
possibility of giving United States patent protection extraterritorial 
effects.”27  Therefore, since the court found that “it is beyond dispute that 
the location of the beneficial use and function of the whole operable 
[BlackBerry] system assembly is the United States,”28 RIM directly 
infringed, under the terms of section 271(a), by “using” the accused system 
in the United States.29 
II. ORIGINS OF THE “CONTROL AND BENEFICIAL USE” RULE 
¶8 The Federal Circuit relied on a scant body of precedent in 
addressing the extraterritoriality question.  The Court of Claims (a 
predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) addressed the 
question only once, in Decca Ltd. v. United States,30 almost 30 years ago.31  
Decca, in turn, relied chiefly on a case decided by the Patent Office Board 
of Interferences, Rosen v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration.32  
The question in Rosen was when, if ever, a satellite-based invention had 
been reduced to practice within the United States.33  The patent applicant, 
Hughes Aircraft, had invented a control system for satellites; every element 
but one, the “control point,” was located on board the satellite.34  After 
deciding that on-ground testing was insufficient to establish an actual 
reduction to practice, the board focused on whether use of the invention 
                                                     
27 Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1369 (quoting and distinguishing Waymark 
Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
28 Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1369. 
29 Id. at 1370. 
30 544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
31 Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1369.  At least one district court has recently 
faced a similar question.  See generally Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston 
Comms. Group, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that the 
defendant’s telecommunications system, which included one element in the 
United States and the rest in Canada, did not infringe the plaintiff’s United 
States patent). 
32 Decca, 544 F.2d at 1074 (citing Rosen v. Nat’l Aeronautics and Space 
Admin., 152 USPQ 757 (1966)).  
33 Rosen, 152 USPQ at 760.  The situation in Rosen arose under the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. § 2457, which provided that 
inventions made in the performance of a NASA contract be assigned to the 
United States government.  Rosen, 152 USPQ at 759.  Since the subject matter 
of the disputed patent application had been conceived before the commencement 
of the contract, the parties disputed the applicability of this statute.  Id. at 760.  
Because the language of National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 expressly 
excluded a constructive reduction to practice (i.e. the filing of an enabling patent 
application), the critical question was the date of actual reduction to practice.  
Id. 
34Rosen, 152 USPQ at 759. 
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while the satellite was in orbit constituted reduction to practice within the 
United States.35  Noting that the invention by its very nature could not fit 
within the territory of the United States, the board determined that since the 
control point, the only terrestrial element of the patent claims, was located 
in the United States, reduction to practice was achieved “within” the United 
States.36   
¶9 Ten years later, Decca presented a similar problem, this time in an 
infringement suit pressed against the United States government.  Decca had 
invented a navigation system including a receiver that processed signals 
transmitted from three geographically diverse sources.37  The United States 
built a system identical to the claimed invention, constructing one of the 
three transmitters in Norway.38  Following the logic of Rosen, the Court of 
Claims emphasized that the invention was inherently incapable of fitting 
within the territory of the United States.39  The court also noted that the 
“focus” of the invention, the inventor’s “true contribution” to the art, 
comprised the processing of the signals at the receiver and the 
synchronization of the tower transmissions, both of which took place in the 
United States.40   
¶10 Acknowledging that the question was “not without doubt,” the court 
ultimately held that the navigation system, an “integrated instrumentality,” 
was “used” within the United States, adopting the trial judge’s statement 
that 
[t]his conclusion does not rest on any one factor but on the 
combination of circumstances here present, with particular emphasis 
on the ownership of equipment by the United States, the control of the 
                                                     
35 Id. at 766. 
36 Id. at 768.  The board expressed its conclusion in tentative, but open-ended 
language, stating “[W]e are inclined to view the operation of the integrated 
instrumentality including parts of the satellite and its control point, the latter 
being in the United States, as not removed from the United States by reason of 
the satellite being necessarily distant from the several states of the United 
States.”  Id.  The board then clarified the importance of the “necessarily distant” 
phrase, adding “[W]e believe our Appellate Court would favorably consider a 
submission that where an inventive act involved an invention of such magnitude 
that it necessarily extended beyond the several states, the inventive act would be 
considered as occurring in the United States.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
37 Decca, 544 F.2d at 1075. 
38 Id. at 1077.  The other two transmitters were located in Hawaii and North 
Dakota.  Id. 
39 Id. at 1074. 
40 Id. at 1083. 
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equipment from the United States, and on the actual beneficial use of 
the system within the United States.41
III. MISAPPLYING A MISBEGOTTEN RULE 
¶11 The Decca court’s comment that “the matter is not free from 
doubt”42 contrasts starkly with the Federal Circuit’s assertion in Research in 
Motion that “it is beyond dispute that the location of the beneficial use and 
function of the whole operable system assembly is in the United States.”43  
In addition to ignoring its predecessor’s expressions of doubt, the Federal 
Circuit also failed to acknowledge the Decca court’s cautionary statement 
that its conclusion rested on the entirety of the circumstances. 
¶12 These “circumstances” included: (1) that the invention was 
incapable of fitting within the territorial boundaries of the United States;44 
(2) that the U.S. government was both the defendant and the operator of the 
system; 45 and (3) that the claims clearly focused on the signal processing 
and control elements of the system, both of which were located in the 
United States.46  Similar circumstances were also found in Rosen: the 
invention was of “such magnitude that it necessarily extended beyond the 
several states,”47 and the patent applicant’s opponent in the proceeding (and 
the actual operator of the patented system) was a U.S. government agency.48  
¶13 In Research in Motion, even accepting that the control and 
“beneficial use” of the accused BlackBerry system occurred in the United 
States, none of these other factors were present.  First, the system was 
certainly capable of fitting entirely within the United States – the 
extraterritorial element was simply a server node located at RIM’s 
headquarters in Canada.49  Second, the claims at issue each included a 
                                                     
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
44 See Decca, 544 F.2d at 1082 (“By its very nature, the system has to have 
transmitters located outside of the territorial boundaries of this country. . .”). 
45 See id. at 1083 (“This conclusion does not rest on any one fact but on the 
combination of circumstances here present, with particular emphasis on the 
ownership of the equipment by the United States. . .”). 
46 See id. at 1083 (“[T]he patentee’s contribution . . . was in a system in which 
signals having a particular relationship were received from spaced sources and 
utilized in the receiver. . .”).  The claim at issue was formulated in what is now a 
rather archaic construction; today a patent drafter would likely formulate 
separate apparatus claims for the receiver and control apparatus, thus possibly 
avoiding the territoriality question entirely. 
47 Rosen v. Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 152 USPQ 757, 768 (1966). 
48 Id. at 758. 
49 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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number of complicated nodes in a wireless e-mail system; hence, there was 
no “focus” on elements residing only in the United States.50  The 
extraterritorial BlackBerry Relay, the “interface switch” in the claim 
terminology, provided several intermediate functions within the claimed 
apparatus; it was not merely a passive endpoint like the transmitter tower in 
Decca.51   Finally, the U.S. government was obviously not the defendant.  
Here, to the contrary, a potential collision with another nation’s sovereignty 
interests clearly existed.52 
                                                     
50 See id. at 1367 (“[T]he ‘patented invention’ is not one single device, but rather 
a system comprising multiple distinct components or a method with multiple 
distinct steps. . .”).  Typical is claim 1 of United States Patent No. 5,436,960 
(issued Jul. 25, 1995), on which claim 15, in suit, depended:   
 
1. A system for transmitting originated information from one of a plurality 
of originating processors in an electronic mail system to at least one of a 
plurality of destination processors in the electronic mail system 
comprising:   at least one gateway switch in the electronic mail system, 
one of the at least one gateway switch receiving the originated information 
and storing the originated information prior to transmission of the 
originated information to the at least one of the plurality of destination 
processors; a RF information transmission network for transmitting the 
originated information to at least one RF receiver which transfers the 
originated information to the at least one of the plurality of destination 
processors; at least one interface switch, one of the at least one interface 
switch connecting at least one of the at least one gateway switch to the RF 
information transmission network and transmitting the originated 
information received from the gateway switch to the RF information 
transmission network; and wherein the originated information is 
transmitted to the one interface switch by the one gateway switch in 
response to an address of the one interface switch added to the originated 
information at the one of the plurality of originating processors or by the 
electronic mail system and the originated information is transmitted from 
the one interface switch to the RF information transmission network with 
an address of the at least one of the plurality of destination processors to 
receive the originated information added at the originating processor, or 
by either the electronic mail system or the one interface switch; and the 
electronic mail system transmits other originated information from one of 
the plurality of originating processors in the electronic mail system to at 
least one of the plurality of destination processors in the electronic mail 
system through a wireline without transmission using the RF information 
transmission network.   
Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1350-51. 
51 See supra note 50; supra note 46. 
52 The Canadian government, in an unusual action, filed a brief with the Federal 
Circuit in January 2005, requesting an en banc rehearing of the Research in 
Motion case.  Michael Geist, Why Ottawa should stand on guard in RIM case, 
   
2005 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 17 
¶14 Even if the rule of law articulated by the court was sound, the 
Federal Circuit’s application of that rule to the facts was brief and 
conclusory.  Without addressing the important circumstances discussed in 
Decca and Rosen, the court dispensed with the issue of “control” by simply 
stating that RIM’s system was controlled in the United States, providing no 
supporting explanation.53  Decca had emphasized that operational control of 
the extraterritorial element (the Norwegian transmitter) occurred entirely 
from the United States, including monitoring and synchronization of the 
transmitted signals “used” by receivers in the United States.54  But in 
Research in Motion, the Federal Circuit said nothing about how RIM, a 
Canadian company, controlled the BlackBerry Relay, located in Canada, 
from the United States.  Likewise, the beneficial use attributed to RIM was 
left unelaborated.  The court simply announced that “the location of RIM’s 
customers and their purchase of the BlackBerry devices establish[es] 
control and beneficial use of the BlackBerry system within the United 
States.”55   
¶15 In reaching its holding, the Federal Circuit relied on the phrase 
“control and beneficial use” as if it embodied a long-standing doctrinal 
principle.  But in doing so, it failed to appreciate the unique circumstances 
from which it arose.  The Board of Interferences in Rosen had indeed 
emphasized the term “control point.”56  But rather than enunciating a legal 
principle, the board was instead simply reciting a key element of the patent 
claim!57  This “control point” was in fact the only element of the claim 
present in the United States,58 so manning the control point was the only 
possible way to “use” (and thus reduce to practice) the claimed invention 
within the United States.   
                                                                                                                       
TOR. STAR, Jan. 25, 2005, at D2.  Its brief asserted that the Federal Circuit’s 
decision “negatively impacts the ‘integrity of the operation of Canadian 
intellectual property laws.’”  Id.  Consider the Decca court’s comment on this 
issue: “Any foreign country that consents to the entry of any element of the 
Omega system into its territory impliedly consents also, it would seem, to 
abstain from any application of its own patent law that would interfere with the 
intended use.”  Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1074 (Ct. Cl. 1976).  
This assertion makes sense in the context of a nation granting the United States 
permission to construct a radio transmitter; it is less plausible in the context of 
private parties constructing nodes on the Internet. 
53 Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1370. 
54 Decca, 544 F.2d at 553. 
55 Research in Motion, 392 F.3d at 1370. 
56 See supra, note 36 and accompanying text. 
57 Rosen v. Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 152 USPQ 757, 759 (1966).  
There were actually two claims pending in the disputed patent application; claim 
21 included a “control point,” while claim 27 referred to a “control means.”  Id.  
58 Id. 
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¶16 Decca echoed the Rosen board’s emphasis on control, but for a 
somewhat different reason.  In Decca, the trial judge had provided a 
comprehensive analysis of the territorial issues and concluded, based on the 
“combination of circumstances,” that the government’s system infringed.59  
One of the key circumstances, as noted above, was that the focus of the 
invention was the manner in which the navigation receivers processed the 
signals received from the relatively passive transmitters.60  Thus, the trial 
judge concluded, the question of “use” was easier to resolve than whether 
the system was “made” in the United States.61  Since, the navigation 
receivers were installed and operated on government aircraft and ships, the 
judge found that this use was “within” the United States,62 implicitly relying 
on the so-called “floating islands” theory of territorial jurisdiction.63  
However, the Court of Claims, while adopting the trial judge’s conclusions, 
expressed concern with the trial judge’s implicit conclusion that the 
navigation receivers installed on government aircraft and ships were 
unquestionably in U.S. territory.64  The court raised the issue, but avoided 
addressing it directly, stating: 
[A] decision founded on the fiction that for purposes of the Patent 
Laws, United States ships and planes wherever found, are United 
States territory, would be founded on water.  We think, however, that 
the question can be left open, and still we find enough other basis for 
concluding that the location of the infringement is within United States 
territory, not abroad as in Deepsouth.65
¶17 Having deemphasized the trial court’s conclusion that the 
“beneficial use” of the system occurred in U.S. territory whenever 
navigators, aboard United States vessels, utilized the receivers, 66 the Court 
of Claims felt it necessary to emphasize the only portion of the system 
                                                     
59 Decca, 544 F.2d at 1083. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 1082 (“Analyzed from the standpoint of a use instead of a making . . . a 
somewhat clearer picture emerges.”). 
62 Id. at 1081. 
63 Burk, supra note 2, at 37-38.  Burk provides a brief discussion of the rise and 
fall of the “floating islands” theory of jurisdiction in patent law.  Id. 
64 Decca, 544 F.2d at 1072.  The court noted a line of contradictory and 
confusing cases dealing with whether ship-borne devices could infringe a United 
States patent, dating back to Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1857).  Decca, 
544 F.2d at 1073.  
65 Decca, 544 F.2d at 1074. 
66 This part of the trial court’s analysis appears to be the origin of the “beneficial 
use” term: “[T]he beneficial use of the completed assembly actually occurs 
within the jurisdiction of the United States, when either a vessel or an airplane 
equipped with an Omega receiver and owned by the [United States government] 
receives and utilizes the signals in the manner claimed.”  Id. at 1081. 
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actually within the United States, the “master” station, which was located in 
Washington, D.C.  The court noted that the system was synchronized and 
monitored through this master station, and analogized the master station to 
the control point in Rosen.67  Ultimately, the court seemed to believe, the 
system had to reside somewhere, so since it had “planted several of its feet” 
in the United States,68 the court concluded that “the location of the whole 
for purposes of the United States Patent Law is where the ‘master’ station or 
stations are.”69  From this confusing analysis and somewhat forced 
conclusion emerged the “control point” test applied three decades later in 
Research in Motion. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE “CONTROL AND BENEFICIAL USE” RULE 
¶18 In applying the dubiously derived control and beneficial use rule to 
the facts in Research in Motion, the Federal Circuit created two problems.  
First, the court’s failure to provide an adequate explanation is likely to 
cause far more confusion than would otherwise have arisen.  Second, the 
Federal Circuit has seriously, and unjustifiably, undermined the Deepsouth 
doctrine.   
A. Confusion 
¶19 Research in Motion left a number of important questions 
unresolved, which will likely lead to much uncertainty among the lower 
courts.  For example, what makes a particular use beneficial?  Precedent 
provides no clue, and the court supplied no answer.  Recasting the “use” 
proscribed by section 271(a) as “beneficial use” appears to be of little help 
in determining the elements or limitations of the “use within the United 
States” required by section 271(a).   
¶20 Moreover, what constitutes control?  In the Internet age, it is easy to 
imagine a system having elements distributed across the globe, with no 
discernable control point.70  Similarly, as wireless systems begin to 
complement and merge with the Internet, innovative new systems are likely 
to be deployed with little regard for territorial borders.  One can imagine a 
system deployed in such a manner that its control is indisputably outside the 
United States, while the beneficial use occurs inside.71  So, are both control 
                                                     
67 Id. at 1074. 
68 Id. at 1075. 
69 Id. at 1074. 
70 Dan L. Burk, Communications Symposium: Transborder Intellectual Property 
Issues on the Electronic Frontier, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9, 11 (1994). 
71 See Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Communications Group, Inc., 198 F. 
Supp. 2d 11 (D. Mass. 2002).  The accused system in Freedom Wireless enabled 
pre-paid wireless services for Canadian consumers, but included one system 
node located in the United States.  Id. at 13-14.  The court held that the system 
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and beneficial use inside the United States required to infringe section 
271(a)?  Research in Motion provides no guidance. 
B. A New Framework for Analyzing Territoriality? 
¶21 The second problem is that the Federal Circuit appears to have 
disregarded the Deepsouth doctrine, without providing any justification.  
Although the precise legal holding of Deepsouth was effectively 
“overruled” by Congressional action,72 the doctrinal core of the decision 
remained clear: because of a traditional hostility to the patent “monopoly,” 
the courts should construe patent law conservatively.73  Deepsouth 
recognized that the behavior it refused to enjoin might be undesirable, but it 
deferred to Congress to explicitly proscribe it.  While paying lip service to 
Deepsouth, the Federal Circuit was too eager to distinguish it, ignoring its 
underlying principle. 
¶22 The Research in Motion court’s willingness to disregard the 
Supreme Court’s direction in Deepsouth may be the result of a (perhaps 
unwitting) shift in theoretical frameworks.  Among the possible frameworks 
for analyzing the jurisdictional issues in patent law are several suggested 
during the debate over whether legislation was necessary to protect U.S. 
patents in space: 
1. Territorial Jurisdiction, based on the geographic 
territory of a state; 
2. Nationality Jurisdiction, based on the nationality of 
persons or entities subjected to state control; . . . and 
[3.] The Passive Personality Principle, based on the ability 
(some would say the duty) of a state to act with regard 
to any action by a foreigner outside its territory where 
                                                                                                                       
did not infringe the plaintiff’s United States patent because the system’s control 
point was in Canada and because the system was used by Canadian residents.  
Id. at 24.  The question would have been much more difficult had the same 
system configuration been employed to serve United States residents. 
72 Burk, supra note 2, at 34. 
73 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) 
(“[W]e must consider petitioner’s claim in light of this Nation’s historical 
antipathy to monopoly . . . .”); id. at 531 (“To that end the prerequisites to 
obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the patent has issued the 
limitations on its exercise are equally strictly enforced.”) (quoting Sears 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964)).  See also Decca, 544 
F.2d at 1073 (noting “the canon of hostile interpretation mentioned in the 
Deepsouth case”). 
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that action would substantially affect the person or 
property of a citizen.74
¶23 The choice between the first two of these principles, territorial 
jurisdiction and nationality jurisdiction, was precisely the concern of the 
Court of Claims in Decca.  The trial judge had emphasized the territorial 
aspects of the government’s installation and use of the navigation system, 
including its use on government ships.75  He also emphasized that the 
system was used and made by the U.S. government,76 thus implicitly 
invoking a theory of jurisdiction based on the nationality of the users.  In 
modifying the trial judge’s opinion, the Court of Claims deemed 
unnecessary the “fiction” that U.S. territory extended to vessels at sea.77  
The court nonetheless relied on a territorial jurisdiction theory, creating the 
no more plausible fiction that the location of a global system is where its 
control point resides.78  In any case, the U.S. government’s ownership and 
operation of the accused system was clearly also a factor, thus bringing into 
play issues of jurisdiction based on the nationality of the owner and 
operator.79 
¶24 Rosen is probably best understood as an application of the territorial 
jurisdiction theory.  The bulk of the patented invention was located in orbit, 
effectively outside the sovereign territory of any nation, but was a United 
States spacecraft, analogous to the ships and aircraft in Decca.  To the 
extent that the satellite is viewed as a floating island of U.S. territory, the 
territorial theory of jurisdiction would apply.80  The remainder of the 
                                                     
74 Glenn H. Reynolds, Space Law Forum: Legislative Comment: The Patents in 
Space Act, 3 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 13, 18 (1990).  Reynolds also listed two 
other possible frameworks, the “Protective Jurisdiction” and “Universal 
Jurisdiction” frameworks, and suggested that only the territorial and nationality 
jurisdictional theories were applicable to the issue of extending patent rights into 
space.  Id.   Reynolds went on to note that the Supreme Court appears to prefer 
the nationality jurisdiction theory in this setting: “The jurisdiction which [the 
‘floating island’ theory] is intended to describe arises out of the nationality of 
the ship, as established by her domicile, registry and use of the flag, and 
partakes more of the characteristics of personal than of territorial sovereignty.”  
Id. at 19 (quoting Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923)). 
75 See supra note 64. 
76 Decca, 544 F.2d at 1081. 
77 Id. at 1074. 
78 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
79 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
80 In 1990, Congress amended the law to explicitly bring such spacecraft within 
the reach of the United States patent code.  See 35 U.S.C. § 105; S. Rep. No. 
101-266, at 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4058, 4062.  The 
congressional record cites as justification for the amendment the uncertainty of 
the applicability of the previous law to orbiting spacecraft given the holdings in 
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invention (the “control point”) was both physically present in the United 
States and operated by U.S. government personnel.81  
¶25 In contrast, the facts in Research in Motion map poorly to either of 
these theories.  The BlackBerry relay, a necessary element for infringement 
of the claims in suit, was located in Canada, and was neither owned, 
installed, nor operated by U.S. government personnel or U.S. citizens.82  
While the system, including the BlackBerry relay, was accessed and “used” 
by U.S. citizens, the Federal Circuit attributed “beneficial use” of the 
system to RIM, a Canadian entity.83  As the Federal Circuit put it: 
Like the court in Decca, we conclude that the location of RIM’s 
customers and their purchase of the BlackBerry devices establishing 
control and beneficial use of the BlackBerry system within the United 
States satisfactorily establish territoriality under section 271(a).84
While the court reached the same conclusion (infringement) as the Decca 
court, its reasoning was quite different.  Here, the actions of RIM’s 
customers appeared to be essential to establishing jurisdiction.85  The court 
never clearly articulated a theory that brings the extraterritorial element of 
the BlackBerry system under the jurisdiction of the patent code. 
¶26 In finding direct infringement by RIM, a foreign entity, for acts 
occurring at least partly outside the sovereign territory of the United States, 
the Federal Circuit appeared to be implicitly working under a theory akin to 
the Passive Personality Principle mentioned above.  The primary concern, 
albeit unstated, seemed to be protecting the interests of U.S. citizens (or at 
least holders of U.S. patents) from foreign activities that threatened those 
interests.   
                                                                                                                       
Deepsouth and Decca.  S. Rep. No. 101-266, at 3-4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4058, 4060-61. 
81 A theory of jurisdiction based on the nationality of the operator fits poorly to 
the situation in Rosen, as the board was not determining liability of the operator; 
rather, the critical question was whether reduction to practice occurred within 
the United States.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text.   
82 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
83 Id. at 1370.   
84 Id. 
85 The court’s approach raises the possibility of a different theory for liability.  
Following the court’s logic, it seems plausible to find that the users (i.e. 
consumers) of the BlackBerry system infringe the NTP patents.  See id. at 1368 
(“[W]e conclude that when two domestic users communicate via their 
BlackBerry devices, their use of the BlackBerry system occurs ‘within the 
United States’. . .”).  Therefore, RIM might be liable for inducement of 
infringement, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  However, Research in Motion affirmed 
a finding of direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  392 F.3d at 1370. 
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¶27 This rationale is certainly not compelled by precedent; as shown 
above Decca and Rosen are more readily understood as applications of 
entirely different principles.  Furthermore, Deepsouth, the only related 
precedent that is actually binding on the Federal Circuit, appears to warn 
directly against extending patent rights in such an ambiguous setting.86  As 
the Supreme Court said in Deepsouth: 
We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before 
approving the position of a litigant who . . . argues that the beachhead 
of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts 
had previously thought.87
¶28 Deepsouth’s strict interpretation of section 271(a) would appear to 
preclude resort to any theory other than the theory of territorial jurisdiction 
in interpreting the term “within the United States.”88  Decca and Rosen 
generally adhere to this theory, although Decca is arguably influenced by 
the overwhelming involvement of the U.S. government in the case.  If 
Research in Motion signals that the courts are now more willing to react 
simply to protect the interests of U.S. patent holders, the beachhead of the 
patent privilege might become very wide indeed. 
CONCLUSION 
¶29 The language of section 271(a) is uncomplicated: an infringer is one 
who “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention within the United States.”89  Research in Motion cited no evidence 
of a clear and certain signal that Congress intended or desired that the 
phrase “within the United States” cover certain activities taking place 
outside the United States.  The Supreme Court, in the only case remotely on 
point, has expressly stated “our patent system makes no claim to 
extraterritorial effect.”90  Yet the Federal Circuit has now concluded that our 
patent system can reach at least across the Canadian border.  Just how far 
can it go? 
                                                     
86 See Burk, supra note 2, at 54 (“Such cautiousness should be at the forefront of 
extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law as indicated by the Supreme Court 
in Deepsouth Packing.”).  
87 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972).  It must 
be noted that the Supreme Court’s decision was by a five-to-four vote.  The 
dissent vigorously decried the majority’s “rigid construction” of the patent code.  
Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
88 But see Reynolds, supra note 74 (endorsing the territorial and nationality 
jurisdictional theories in the context of patent rights in space). 
89 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
90 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531. 
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¶30 The Federal Court’s approach in Research in Motion is not 
altogether surprising.  In the same article in which he predicted the dilemma 
faced by the Research in Motion court, Professor Burk noted a “strong 
commitment by U.S. courts to enforce patent exclusivity against foreign 
infringers whenever a nexus with U.S. territory exists.91  But Professor Burk 
also noted that the “rash, reflexive, or mechanical enforcement of the patent 
laws could also have unpleasant results.”92  
¶31 There is no easy solution to the problem posed by Research in 
Motion.  However, Congress is likely better equipped than the courts to 
grapple with the extraterritoriality problem, which is fundamentally 
intertwined with economic and sovereignty questions.93  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Deepsouth ultimately prompted Congressional action; 
the law is now explicit with regards to the export of unassembled 
inventions.  The “control and beneficial use” test laid out by Research in 
Motion is beguilingly simple in appearance.  But the Internet age is not so 
simple – the complex and rapidly evolving world of international 
communications will present complications that defy simple rules.94  The 
Federal Circuit missed a chance to send a clear and certain signal to 
Congress that there are limits to what the judiciary can do in response to the 
complex realities of the Internet age.  Instead, it signaled that everything is 
fine.  In the end, however, we may find this deceptively simple control and 
beneficial use test, just as the floating islands theory of territoriality before 
it, to be founded on water.  
                                                     
91 Burk, supra note 2, at 34.  See also Margaret A. Boulware et al, An Overview 
of Intellectual Property Rights Abroad, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 441, 490 (1994) 
(“[A]ctivities in foreign countries can be enjoined [by United States courts] if 
they have sufficient nexus to infringing activity in the United States.”). 
92 Burk, supra note 2, at 48. 
93 See id. at 49. 
94 See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 
1120 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, rehearing en banc granted, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th 
Cir. 2005), for an example of another dimension of jurisdictional issues caused 
by the Internet.  In Yahoo!, the U.S.-based service provider asked a United 
States federal court for relief from a court order issued by a French court that 
required the provider to block access by French citizens to certain items on the 
Yahoo! Auction site.  Brendon Fowler, Cara Franklin & Bob Hyde, Can You 
Yahoo!? The Internet’s Digital Fences, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12 ¶ 1-3 
(2001), available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001dltr0012.html (last visited 
May 13, 2005).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
finding no jurisdiction over the French defendants, reversed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment, Yahoo!, 379 F.3d at 1121, but later granted a 
rehearing, which at the time of this writing has not been heard, Yahoo!, 399 F.3d 
at 1010. 
   
